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Faculty and Deans

THE CASE FOR EHEARSAY
Jeffrey Bellin*
On April 4, 2014, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of
Evidence convened the Symposium on the Challenges of Electronic
Evidence. The purpose of the symposium was “to consider the intersection
of the evidence rules and emerging technologies” and explore what rule
changes, if any, might be warranted in light of sweeping changes in the way
people communicate.1 As an unapologetic advocate for changes to the
hearsay rules, I thought it a happy coincidence that the symposium
coincided with Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner’s call for sweeping
hearsay reform. 2
In a 2013 article, eHearsay, 3 I proposed a hearsay exception for
“Recorded Statements of Recent Perception” (RSRPs).4 The exception is
designed to distinguish reliable from unreliable electronic communication
(e.g., text messages and social media posts) and permit the former to be
presented to fact-finders. The Advisory Committee invited me to present
my RSRP exception at its symposium. After my presentation, a member of
the Advisory Committee, Professor Paul Shechtman, provided formal
comments on my proposal. Some of these comments resonated with a
response Professor Colin Miller published to eHearsay, concurring in part
and dissenting in part to my proposal. 5 This Essay responds to the various
concerns about my proposed hearsay reform raised by Professors Miller,
Shechtman, and others.
Change is never easy. Proponents of changes to the evidence rules fairly
bear the burden of persuasion that any particular reform is preferable to the
status quo. In this Essay, I aim to do just that, while also addressing Judge
Posner’s suggestion for hearsay reform. While I agree with the judge’s call
for a more permissive attitude toward the admission of hearsay, I believe
* Associate Professor, William & Mary Law School. I would like to thank Colin Miller and
Paul Shechtman for their comments and critiques of my eHearsay rule and Dan Capra, Judge
Sidney Fitzwater, and the members of the Advisory Committee for the opportunity to present
my proposal at the Symposium on the Challenges of Electronic Evidence.
1. See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of April 3, 2012,
at 13 (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
Agenda%20Books/Evidence/EV2012-10.pdf.
2. See United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 800 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
3. Jeffrey Bellin, eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. REV. 7 (2013).
4. Id.
5. See Colin Miller, No Explanation Required? A Reply to Jeffrey Bellin’s eHearsay,
98 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 34 (2013).
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his prescription—replacing the hearsay rules with a “residual” exception
powered by judicial reliability assessments—is a recipe for evidentiary
chaos. Instead, I continue to advocate for my proposed exception, which
would permit a wide swath of recorded out-of-court statements to be
introduced at trial, while retaining the class-based hearsay exception
framework adopted by the Federal Rules of Evidence forty years ago, and
all of the States.
I. THE PROPOSED EHEARSAY EXCEPTION
For ease of reference, I begin by setting out my RSRP exception.
Accepting the framework of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a given, the
proposed exception would necessitate compact additions to two existing
rules of evidence: Rule 804, which lists hearsay exceptions that apply when
the declarant is unavailable; and Rule 801, which applies when the
declarant testifies. The proposed additions to those rules are set out below.
Italicized text represents additions; non-italicized text (including the bolded
titles) is unchanged from the existing federal rules and included for
context.6
Rule 804. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay—When the
Declarant Is Unavailable As a Witness
...
(b) The Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the rule against
hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
...
(5) Recorded Statement of Recent Perception.
A recorded
communication that describes or explains an event or condition recently
perceived by the declarant, but not including:
(A) a statement made in contemplation of litigation, or to a person who is
investigating, litigating, or settling a potential or existing claim; or
(B) an anonymous statement.
Rule 801. . . . Exclusions from Hearsay
...
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the
following conditions is not hearsay:

6. In eHearsay, the proposed language appears in a text box for emphasis. See Bellin,
supra note 3, at 36. This effort to emphasize the proposed text partially backfired. On
Westlaw, the entire text box is omitted and replaced with: “TABULAR OR GRAPHIC
MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE”; on Lexis, the
proposed text is replaced with only: “Figure 1.” Consequently, those seeking out eHearsay
would be well served to download it from HeinOnline; the Minnesota Law Review website
(http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/articles/ehearsay/);
or
SSRN
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2232345).
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(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is
subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement:
...
(D) would qualify as a Recorded Statement of Recent Perception under
Rule 804(b)(5) if the declarant were unavailable.

As explained in eHearsay, this exception represents a modified version
of the hearsay exception for “Statements of Recent Perception” adopted by
the Advisory Committee in 1969, but ultimately rejected by Congress.7
II. APPLICATION OF THE RULE
I refer readers to eHearsay for justifications for the RSRP exception’s
precise language and illustrations of how various terms and phrases should
be interpreted. 8 Here, I demonstrate the straightforward application of the
exception with two examples drawn from recent case law.
A. State v. Petersen and Rule 804(b)(5)
The first example comes from a 2013 Iowa case, where the prosecution
The
charged Thomas Petersen with murdering his wife Judy.9
prosecution’s evidence included a text message from Judy to a friend that
claimed Thomas had threatened her over the weekend. According to Judy’s
text message: “He said he . . . planned on attending a funeral in two weeks
and it wasn’t his. . . . When I asked if he was threatening me he told me to
figure it out.”10
The prosecution offered the recorded text message exchange (which also
included a discussion of a custody battle) to prove the truth of the matter
Judy asserted—i.e., that the defendant threatened to kill her shortly before
her death due to ill will arising out of the custody battle.11 Thus, as the
State conceded, the message was hearsay.12
Applying my proposed exception, however, the text message would
easily qualify for admission.
The declarant (Judy Petersen) was
unavailable.
Her still-extant text message constituted a “recorded
communication” from a known (i.e., not anonymous) sender. It described a
“recently perceived” occurrence (the threats), and there was no indication
that Judy sent the text message in contemplation of litigation.13 Thus, Judy
7. See Bellin, supra note 3, at 33–35.
8. See id. at 35–52.
9. State v. Petersen, No. 12-1114, 2013 WL 2370717, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 30,
2013).
10. See id. at *2.
11. See id.
12. See id. The court went on to hold that the statement was admissible under the
“residual exception” to the hearsay rule. See id. at *2–4.
13. See Bellin, supra note 3, at 44–46 (discussing case law applying anticipation of
litigation restriction); id. at 41–44 (describing recently perceived limitation). These limits
are derived from similar provisions in Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(4)(c) and proposed Rule
804(b)(2). See id. at 41–46. The recently perceived limitation resembles the “fresh in the
witness’s memory” requirement in Rule 803(5)(B).
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Petersen’s text message could be shown to the jury as an RSRP under
proposed Rule 804(b)(5).
B. United States v. Blackett and Rule 801(d)(1)(D)
The next example is from United States v. Blackett,14 where a witness’s
testimony that she was bribed while serving as a juror was supplemented
with the following text message she sent her sister after the alleged bribe
attempt: “You see why I tell you I ain’t want to be no damn juror. Some
dude just come by my house and tell me he going pay me money to say not
guilty.”15
Again, the text message (erroneously admitted in Blackett as a recorded
recollection)16 neatly fits within the proposed exception. The requirements
are the same as described in the preceding example, except that for Rule
801(d)(1)(D), the (available) declarant must testify. Here, the declarant
testified and her still-extant text message constituted a “recorded
communication” from a known sender. It described a “recently perceived”
occurrence (the bribery attempt), and there is no indication that the text
message was made in contemplation of litigation. Thus, the text message
could be admitted and shown to the jury as an RSRP under proposed Rule
801(d)(1)(D).
These examples illustrate two points. First, by using actual evidence
offered in real cases, the examples provide realistic tests of the rule’s
application; these are not sanitized hypotheticals carefully calibrated to
make the proposed rule look good (or bad). Second, the text messages
described above are representative of the types of communications that have
become an everyday part of our lives (relating recent occurrences to friends
and family)—and are the kind of evidence that no rational person would
ignore when trying to resolve a subsequent dispute.
III. THE STATUS QUO AND THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTION
The RSRP exception would not be necessary if courts could achieve the
same (or better) results in screening reliable from unreliable electronic
utterances through the existing hearsay rules. In this section, I explain why
the existing hearsay rules are inadequate.
A. Relying on Existing Hearsay Exceptions
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that it is not only the electronic
medium of communication that necessitates changes to existing evidence
rules but the parallel emergence of an entirely new communication norm.
As surveys by the Pew Internet and American Life Project demonstrate,
people are continuously texting and electronically messaging friends,

14. 481 F. App’x 741 (3d Cir. 2012).
15. Brief for the Appellee at 8–9, Blackett, 481 F. App’x 741 (No. 2011-1556), 2012
WL 248361, at *3–4.
16. See Blackett, 481 F. App’x at 742.
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relatives, and acquaintances about recent events.17 The communications are
often preserved (with a precise time and date stamp). And because these
communications generally arise before any litigation, they provide valuable
and often otherwise unavailable (due to memory failings or lack of
cooperation) insight into later-disputed facts. Existing hearsay rules might
be able to process these communications correctly, but when they do, it is
only happenstance. As I argued in eHearsay:
A set of rules that arose at a time when people communicated in a
completely different manner (i.e., in person, by letter, and through
landline phones) is unlikely to account for the dangers or benefits of outof-court statements communicated on social media sites, in Internet chat
rooms, and via text messaging.18

Thinking broadly about electronic communication, one can readily
imagine the types of communications that, while relevant and reliable, will
be lost to juries under existing hearsay doctrine. Communications that arise
shortly, but not “immediately” after an observed event and are not uttered in
a state of excitement or by the dying, will not qualify as present sense
impressions, excited utterances, or dying declarations.
Electronic
statements (e.g., text messages) made by bystanders, other uninterested
parties, or deceased victims will not qualify as statements of a party, or
statements against interest. These compelling pieces of evidence, frozen in
time and accessible in discovery, will be senselessly kept from juries.
Thus, while it is certainly the case that courts can continue to apply
existing hearsay exceptions to determine the admissibility of out-of-court
statements captured in email, text messages, and social media posts, the
cost will be twofold: (1) valuable evidence will be excluded because it does
not fall within an existing exception; and (2) courts will be tempted to
distort the existing rules to admit reliable electronic messages like those
described in Part II. For example, in Blackett, the trial court erroneously
admitted the text message as a recorded recollection (Rule 803(5)) even
though the witness had no trouble recollecting the described event.19 And
in Petersen, the Iowa Court of Appeals relied on the residual exception,
finding reliability in one always-present aspect of recorded communication:
“the text messages could be seen and evaluated by the trier of fact.”20
Judges are already struggling to fit modern electronic communications
into the dusty hearsay framework. Many of the examples discussed in
eHearsay come from appellate rulings that deem trial courts to have
erroneously admitted text messages, social media posts, and the like under

17. See Bellin, supra note 3, at 13–17 (reviewing survey data on new communication
norm).
18. Id. at 24.
19. See Blackett, 481 F. App’x at 742; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(5)(A) (excepting
hearsay statements concerning matters the declarant “once knew about but now cannot
recall”).
20. State v. Petersen, No. 12-1114, 2013 WL 2370717, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 30,
2013).
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an existing exception.21 The temptation to do so is understandable. Courts
are consciously or subconsciously applying a reliability norm and in so
doing are tempted to contort existing evidence rules either to admit reliable
electronic utterances that do not fit traditional hearsay exceptions, or
exclude unreliable electronic utterances that do. Thus, counter to the
sentiment captured in the header of this section, the “status quo” is not a
real option. Change is coming. The real question is whether this change
will be reflected in the loss of valuable evidence and “increasing slippage
between what the evidence rules allow and what (some) courts admit,”22 or
a new rule specifically tailored to harness the virtues of a world of
electronic communication.
B. The Residual Exception As a Conduit for Electronic Evidence
Those who would place their faith in the existing hearsay framework’s
ability to handle electronic communication buttress their argument by
pointing to the existing safety valve: the “residual exception” contained in
Rule 807. As already noted, the Petersen court relied on this exception to
admit the victim’s text messages. 23 If the existing exceptions are not up to
the task, this argument goes, the residual exception can pick up the slack, as
in Petersen. I disagree.
First, the residual exception was never intended to serve as a platform for
the creation of broad hearsay exceptions. After it was proposed in two
separate exceptions, the residual exception was rejected by the House of
Representatives only to be resurrected by the Senate.24 Responding to the
House’s concerns of overuse, the Senate Judiciary Committee explained its
understanding that the residual exception now found in Rule 807
will be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The
committee does not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to
admit hearsay statements that do not fall within one of the other
exceptions contained in rules 803 and 804(b). The residual exceptions are
not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule,
including its present exceptions.
Such major revisions are best
accomplished by legislative action.25

Relying on the residual exception to routinely shepherd reliable hearsay
found in email, text messages, and social media posts through the hearsay
rules (as in Petersen) would constitute precisely what the Senate Judiciary
Committee warned against: “[a] major judicial revision[] of the hearsay
rule.”26 The legislative history counsels that such a revision should be
accomplished through “legislative action,” i.e., the normal rulemaking
process, not Rule 807.27
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See Bellin, supra note 3, at 26 n.75 (collecting cases).
Id. at 26.
Petersen, 2013 WL 2370717, at *2–4.
S. REP. NO. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7065.
Id. at 7066.
Id.
Id.
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Second, even if the legislature had not expressed its intent so clearly,
reliance on the residual exception in this context is unwise. The residual
exception simply does not provide the precision necessary to regulate
anything but truly exceptional, statement-specific circumstances. The
exception’s primary restrictions on the admission of hearsay are that:
(i) the proffered statement contains “circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness” that are “equivalent” to statements that would be permitted
by “Rule 803 or 804”; and (ii) “admitting it will best serve the purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice.”28 The first requirement is opaque
given that statements that fall within Rule 803 or 804 exceptions contain
widely varying guarantees of trustworthiness. Indeed, hearsay admitted
under Rule 804(b)(6) (forfeiture by wrongdoing) contains no guarantee of
trustworthiness whatsoever: the principle of admission is one of estoppel.29
Statements admitted as excited utterances, present sense impressions,
statements against interest, and dying declarations all suffer from wellknown reliability flaws.30 Statements falling under Rule 803(4) might
provide a counterpoint, as statements to a medical provider for purposes of
diagnosis or treatment seem quite trustworthy. But, that very exception
breaks with the common law to include statements made “to a physician
consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify”31—statements
that, given the litigation context, are patently unreliable. A judge looking
for concrete guidance in the “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness” requirement of Rule 807 will find none.
Little need be said about Rule 807’s second “restriction.” Statements
that serve the “purposes of the[] rules”32 will be difficult to identify with
precision. Admittedly, there is a rule (Rule 102) that defines the “purpose”
of the rules. It states: “These rules should be construed so as to administer
every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the
truth and securing a just determination.”33 But even if we accept this
statement as expressing the true purpose of the rules, its application merely
duplicates the next portion of Rule 807, which counsels admission only
when it is in “the interests of justice.”34 Again, guidance is lacking.
Distilled to its essence, Rule 807 commands judges to admit statements
that are roughly as reliable as statements admitted under the other hearsay
exceptions, and that will help “ascertain[] the truth and secur[e] a just
determination”35 in “the interests of justice”36—a hopelessly amorphous
28. FED. R. EVID. 807(a).
29. See id. 804(b)(6).
30. See infra notes 66 (dying declarations), 68 (statements against interest); see also
Aviva Orenstein, “My God!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 180 (1997) (chronicling longstanding debate about the
reliability of excited utterances).
31. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (1972) (Note to Paragraph (4)).
32. Id. 807(a)(4).
33. Id. 102.
34. Id. 807(a)(4).
35. Id. 102 (“Purpose”).
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command that trial judges could easily mistake for satire if it did not appear
in so celebrated a legal compendium as the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Thus, we return to where we started. The only true constraint on Rule 807
is the legislative history warning that Rule 807 should be used “very rarely,
and only in exceptional circumstances.”37 The evidentiary framework is
fortunate that courts have, so far, taken this command seriously. The very
existence of a residual rule in a class-based system of hearsay exceptions is
an anomaly.38 Regular reliance on the exception would undermine the
entire enterprise, seeding boundless uncertainty into evidence law.39
If the rarity of its application is Rule 807’s saving grace, it stands to
reason that the rule should not serve as the vehicle for admitting the
countless reliable text messages and social media posts orbiting in
cyberspace. Acquiescing to routine reliance on the residual exception to
funnel electronic communications to fact-finders would, in essence, cede
authority over the admissibility of evidence to judges, unconstrained by
concrete rules. Such discretion means that different courts will treat the
same evidence differently (admitting virtually identical text messages in
some cases and excluding them in others), and given the traditionally
deferential review of evidentiary rulings and amorphous wording of the
residual exception, appellate courts will struggle to standardize trial
practice.
Because the residual exception grants virtually unconstrained discretion
to trial courts, its routine usage will create massive uncertainty for litigants.
That is problematic in our system of justice because virtually all civil and
criminal cases are resolved through settlements, dismissals, and guilty
pleas.40 The only way such a system can be justified is through an
assumption that litigants model their pretrial agreements on the likely
outcome at trial.41 Such modeling is more difficult when the only way to
forecast the admissibility of important evidence is by assessing whether a
36. Id. 807(a)(4).
37. S. REP. NO. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7066.
38. See id. (“[A]n overly broad residual hearsay exception could emasculate the hearsay
rule and the recognized exceptions or vitiate the rationale behind the codification of the
rules.”).
39. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098,
7105 (stating that the House rejected a broad residual rule “because of the conviction that
such a provision injected too much uncertainty into the law of evidence regarding hearsay
and impaired the ability of a litigant to prepare adequately for trial”).
40. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1402, 1407 (2012) (citing U.S. Department of
Justice calculations for the proposition that “97 percent of federal convictions and 94 percent
of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas,” and echoing commentators’ contention
that “plea bargaining is . . . not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal
justice system”); Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State
Courts,
2005,
BUREAU
OF
JUSTICE
STATISTICS
1
(Apr.
9,
2009),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf (reporting survey result of state courts that
“trials . . . accounted for about 3% of all tort, contract, and real property dispositions in
general jurisdiction courts”).
41. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2465 (2004) (discussing literature that largely justifies a system of plea bargains
and settlements on the basis of a “shadow-of-trial” model).
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particular trial judge will agree that its admission serves the “purposes” of
the evidence rules and the “interests of justice.”42
For all its faults, the existing class-based hearsay framework allows
parties to evaluate the admissibility of evidence and the consequent
likelihood of success with minimal judicial guidance, something that would
be sacrificed if a significant portion of the hearsay rules was replaced with
amorphous judicial discretion. This is exactly what the Advisory
Committee sought to avoid when it championed a class-based system of
exceptions.43
C.

Judge Posner’s Proposal: The Residual Exception
As a Replacement for the Hearsay Exceptions

As the discussion in Part III.B foreshadows, I disagree with the recent
proposal by Judge Richard Posner to replace the hearsay exceptions with a
discretionary regime modeled on the residual rule. Judge Posner succinctly
states his proposal in United States v. Boyce44:
I don’t want to leave the impression that . . . I want to reduce the amount
of hearsay evidence admissible in federal trials. What I would like to see
is Rule 807 (“Residual Exception”) swallow much of Rules 801 through
806 and thus many of the exclusions from evidence, exceptions to the
exclusions, and notes of the Advisory Committee. The “hearsay rule” is
too complex, as well as being archaic. Trials would go better with a
simpler rule, the core of which would be the proposition (essentially a
simplification of Rule 807) that hearsay evidence should be admissible
when it is reliable, when the jury can understand its strengths and
limitations, and when it will materially enhance the likelihood of a correct
outcome.45
42. See FED. R. EVID. Art. VIII advisory committee’s note (Introductory Note: The
Hearsay Problem) (rejecting proposal for “individual treatment [of hearsay] in the setting of
the particular case” as “involving too great a measure of judicial discretion, minimizing the
predictability of rulings, [and] enhancing the difficulties of prepar[ing] for trial”); Tome v.
United States, 513 U.S. 150, 164–65 (1995) (noting that the drafters of the Federal Rules
consciously rejected a “statement-by-statement balancing approach” because “[i]t involves
considerable judicial discretion[,] . . . reduces predictability[,] and . . . enhances the
difficulties of trial preparation”); Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform:
The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367, 397 (1992) (noting in hearsay context
that “[p]ractitioners strongly believe they need protection against broad judicial discretion”);
Myrna S. Raeder, Commentary, A Response to Professor Swift: The Hearsay Rule at Work:
Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Discretion?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 507, 516–17
(1992) (decrying courts’ current overreliance on the residual exception as permitting “total
erosion of the hearsay rule by judicial discretion” and resulting in “the worst of all worlds for
litigators who must decide which cases to try by evaluating the potentially admissible
evidence”).
43. FED. R. EVID. Art. VIII advisory committee’s note (1972) (Introductory Note: The
Hearsay Problem) (recognizing that abandoning the class-based system of exceptions in
favor of “individualized treatment” would, among other things, “add[] a further element to
the already over-complicated congeries of pretrial procedures”). This is the same reason I
rejected the “good faith” requirement included in the original Statement of Recent
Perception exception. See Bellin, supra note 3, at 47.
44. 742 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2014).
45. Id. at 802.
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Judge Posner’s suggestion resonates with a venerable tradition dating
back well before the drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In the
modern era, Judge Jack Weinstein crafted perhaps the classic formulation of
this argument. 46 Judge Weinstein argued that the class-based system of
hearsay exceptions championed by John Henry Wigmore should be
replaced with a rule permitting trial courts to determine the admission of
hearsay by weighing its “probative force” against “the possibility of
prejudice, unnecessary use of court time, and availability of more
satisfactory evidence”47—roughly the sentiment now captured in Rule 403.
In the process, he referenced similar proposals by other leading evidence
scholars and implicitly endorsed a generous “residual exception” that could
achieve much of his stated goal. 48 In crafting the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the Advisory Committee considered and rejected Judge
Weinstein’s approach. It explained:
The Advisory Committee has rejected this approach to hearsay as
involving too great a measure of judicial discretion, minimizing the
predictability of rulings, enhancing the difficulties of preparation for trial,
adding a further element to the already over-complicated congeries of
pretrial procedures, and requiring substantially different rules for civil and
criminal cases.49

As explained above, all of the objections the Advisory Committee
brandished against Judge Weinstein can similarly be brought to bear against
Judge Posner. If anything, given ever-expanding dockets and increasing
reliance on settlements and guilty pleas, the criticisms have gained strength
since 1969. 50 Further, the passage of time has likely made it more difficult
as a practical matter to abolish a class-based hearsay framework, given
litigators’ long experience with the framework and its adoption in every
American jurisdiction. There is, in fact, no guarantee that if the Advisory
Committee made such a drastic change, the states would follow suit. The
result could be an even more convoluted system of American evidence law,
where federal and state practitioners would need to learn two vastly
different systems of hearsay rules.
For all of these reasons, my proposal to both reduce the almost
universally maligned force of the hearsay prohibition and take advantage of
the wealth of new electronic evidence adheres to the class-based hearsay

46. See Jack Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331 (1961).
47. Id. at 338–39. In addition, Judge Weinstein would require a notice requirement,
greater leeway for judges to comment on the weight of such evidence, and more stringent
appellate review. See id. at 338–42.
48. Id. at 354–55.
49. FED. R. EVID. Art. VIII advisory committee’s note (1972) (Introductory Note: The
Hearsay Problem). The Committee also noted that permitting judges to exclude evidence on
the basis that they did not “believe it”—i.e., rejecting a statement of a particular hearsay
declarant as untrue—seemed “atypical” and divergent from the normal pattern of permitting
the trier of fact to assess the weight of otherwise admissible evidence. Id.
50. See, e.g., Fed. Judicial Ctr., 1955–2004 Statistical Data Regarding Federal Courts, 8
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 21, 35 (2006) (providing chart documenting rising caseloads and
decreasing reliance on trials in federal courts since 1965).
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framework long ago adopted by the Advisory Committee, Congress, and all
fifty states. It also builds directly on a hearsay reform proposal for
Statements of Recent Perception embraced by the evidence community and
the Advisory Committee at the time of the framing of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 51 In short, my proposal would permit the rules to move toward
the goal urged by Judge Posner (increasing the admissibility of reliable
hearsay evidence) through a more modest means. The proposed exception
fits the pattern of the existing rules, would be viewed as less of a drastic
change, and has the pleasant characteristic of being consistent with a
proposal adopted by the Advisory Committee at an earlier time.
IV. CRITIQUES
Having sketched the case for the RSRP exception and disparaged
potential alternatives, this portion of the Essay responds to specific critiques
of my proposal.
A. A Response to Professors Miller and Shechtman
As part of the symposium on Electronic Evidence, Professor Paul
Shechtman presented a critique of my proposed rule. Professor Shechtman
emphasized that the rule was as much about hearsay as electronic hearsay
and that there were instances where the rule might let in statements that
should be excluded and exclude statements that should be admitted. That
said, he indicated that the proposal was “a very good thing to be talking
about.”52 In an article published shortly after the appearance of eHearsay,
Professor Colin Miller endorsed half of the proposal (proposed Rule
801(d)(1)(D)), but disagreed that statements falling within proposed Rule
804(b)(5) possess sufficient reliability to be excepted from the hearsay
prohibition.53 This portion of the Essay responds to the two professors’
critiques.
As I acknowledged in my presentation and in eHearsay, the proposed
RSRP exception is not limited to “electronic” hearsay. I view this as a
strength of the proposal. It permits the proposed exception to encompass
reliable out-of-court utterances expressed in any medium (much like the
other hearsay exceptions) and provides the flexibility for growth as
communication norms and technologies evolve. Professor Shechtman also
correctly points out that my proposal is a direct outgrowth of hearsay
reform proposals that arose prior to the emergence of electronic
communication. Again, this is something I happily acknowledge, viewing
it as a positive attribute of the proposal. As I emphasized in my
presentation at the symposium, the proposed rule is a direct evolution of the
51. See Bellin, supra note 3, at 33–35.
52. Paul Shechtman, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Remarks at the Symposium
on the Challenges of Electronic Evidence (Apr. 4, 2014), 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1163, 1216
(2014).
53. See Miller, supra note 5, at 46–47, 69. Professor Miller generously concludes that
“eHearsay makes an extraordinarily important contribution to the scant scholarship on the
intersection between electronic evidence and the rules of evidence.” Id. at 71.
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Statement of Recent Perception exception previously adopted by the
Committee. 54 This should give observers some comfort that the rule is not
a fleeting or radical sentiment but instead builds on a long tradition of
evidence thought. In addition, the rule, while not limited to electronic
communication, is tailored to accommodate that medium of expression and
particularly text messages—and for the foreseeable future it is to text
messages that the rule will likely be most commonly applied. Thus, the
proposed rule is both about broadening the amount of evidence that is
admissible over a hearsay objection generally and about accommodating the
rising tide of reliable electronic hearsay.
Professor Shechtman’s other critique—essentially that the rule is both
over- and under-inclusive—is also meritorious. My response is that this is
the case with all the existing hearsay exceptions. One can easily conjure
out-of-court statements that qualify for admission under existing hearsay
exceptions, but could be prudently excluded:
 A murder suspect’s mother’s exclamations to arriving police that the
suspect acted in self-defense: admissible as excited utterances.
 A jailhouse informant’s testimony (in exchange for leniency) that the
defendant, who he met for a few minutes in the jail, admitted
culpability: admissible as a statement of a party.
 An accomplice confession that implicates a defendant in a crime:
admissible as a statement against interest.
The list is endless. To ensure consistency and predictability, any
evidence rule must draw lines. Once lines are drawn, statements can readily
be hypothesized that fall on the “wrong” side of those lines. The RSRP
exception is no different. Recognizing this unassailable fact, the question
becomes not whether one can imagine statements that fall on the wrong side
of the exception, but whether on balance the exception does more good than
harm.
Professor Shechtman’s critique also motivates me to emphasize a critical
point: my proposal is intended as a starting point, not a fait accompli. If
the rule can be improved that is not a reason to reject it, but rather it is a
reason to adopt it with those improvements. One potential improvement is
to restore the “good faith” safeguard from the Statement of Recent
Perception exception.55 Although I would prefer a more concrete rule, an
RSRP exception with a good faith requirement is preferable to no RSRP
exception at all. It bears emphasis as well that the admission of an
unreliable hearsay statement is not fatal to the cause of accurate fact54. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2), 46 F.R.D. 161, 377 (1969); see also 5 Christopher
B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:108 (4th ed. 2013)
(explaining Committee’s inclusion of Rule 804(b)(2) but its subsequent rejection by
Congress).
55. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 205 (1969) (proposing Rule 804(b)(2), which required
a qualifying statement to have been “made in good faith”).
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finding. The adversary system contemplates vigorous debate over the
proper weight to be given any item of evidence. The same arguments that
counsel exclusion of hearsay will, if compelling, cripple its power as
evidence. In an era of receding jury paternalism, there is little to say for the
notion that, while we all might reasonably rely on the text messages and
social media posts of knowledgeable parties to ascertain facts ourselves,
juries cannot be trusted to evaluate them in litigation.
Professor Miller’s critique touches on some of the same concerns as
those raised by Professor Shechtman, although in some ways it is much
narrower. Professor Miller relies on a comparison of the relative reliability
of statements falling under the present sense impression (PSI) hearsay
exception (Rule 803(1)) and those falling under the proposed RSRP
exception. 56 Because Professor Miller believes that statements falling
under the proposed exception would be less reliable than those falling under
the analogous PSI hearsay exception, he deems my proposed Rule
804(b)(5) exception problematic.57 My response is twofold.
First, I quibble with Professor Miller’s comparative reliability
assessment. Although he is correct that there are some respects in which
PSIs may be more reliable than RSRPs (e.g., PSIs must be made closer in
time to the perceived event),58 there are many in which they are not. On
this front, Professor Miller discounts the reliability enhancements in my
proposed exception, which requires a (1) recorded, (2) communication,
(3) not made or obtained in contemplation of litigation, (4) transmitted by a
known sender. None of these reliability safeguards are found in the present
sense impression exception. Three quick examples illustrate the point:
 An anonymous text message sent to Frank that, “I just saw Mike
shoot your brother in cold blood,” could be admitted as a present
sense impression via Frank’s testimony, even if Frank had deleted the
text message and was describing it at trial from memory (to prove
Mike’s guilt) a year later. Such testimony about an electronic
communication would not be permitted under the RSRP exception,
which requires the actual recorded communication to be presented to
the fact-finder and specifically excludes anonymous messages.
 If a police investigator wearing a recording device recorded her
ongoing impressions of an interaction with a defendant suspected of
drunk driving (“his eyes are bloodshot, etc.”), the recording would
qualify for admission over a hearsay objection as a present sense
impression even if the officer never testified. Such a recording would
not be admissible under the RSRP exception because it was “made in
contemplation of litigation.”

56. See Miller, supra note 5, at 62.
57. See id. at 71–72.
58. See id. at 63–64 (contrasting the immediacy required for a present sense impression
with the more flexible time constraint in my proposed exception).
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 A passenger in a car could draft, but not send, an email that described
the car’s progress (“we are stuck in traffic”), save the email, and later
introduce it (perhaps to support an alibi claim) as a “present sense
impression.” The draft email would satisfy the prerequisites of the
present sense impression exception but would not qualify as an RSRP
because, having never been sent, it did not constitute a
“communication.”
In sum, there are concrete reliability safeguards in the RSRP exception
that are absent from the PSI exception, leaving open the question of
whether statements falling under the RSRP or PSI exception are more
reliable.
My second (larger) problem with Professor Miller’s critique, however, is
that his comparison is a loaded one. The present sense impression
exception is located in Rule 803. Rule 803 exceptions permit the admission
of hearsay evidence, “regardless of whether the declarant is available as a
witness.”59 The Advisory Committee Notes explain that Rule 803
“proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate circumstances a hearsay
statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial
even though he may be available.”60 Stated another way, the Advisory
Committee viewed hearsay falling under Rule 803 exceptions to be
superior, or at the very least equivalent, in terms of reliability, to the
declarant’s live testimony. Consequently, Rule 803 exceptions must meet a
very high bar of reliability.61
The portion of my proposed exception that Professor Miller criticizes62
falls within Rule 804, not Rule 803. The key difference between the two
rules, of course, is that Rule 804 is only triggered when the declarant is
“unavailable.”63 As the Advisory Committee explains, this crucial
requirement reflects that Rule 804
proceeds upon a different theory [than Rule 803]: hearsay which
admittedly is not equal in quality to testimony of the declarant on the
stand may nevertheless be admitted [under Rule 804] if the declarant is
unavailable and if his statement meets a specified standard. The rule
expresses preferences: testimony given on the stand in person is preferred
over hearsay, and hearsay, if of the specified quality, is preferred over
complete loss of the evidence of the declarant.64

59. FED. R. EVID. 803.
60. Id. 803 advisory committee’s note (1972 Proposed Rules).
61. See id. 804 advisory committee’s note (1972) (Note to Subdivision (b)) (“Rule 803,
supra, is based upon the assumption that a hearsay statement falling within one of its
exceptions possesses qualities which justify the conclusion that whether the declarant is
available or unavailable is not a relevant factor in determining admissibility.”).
62. Professor Miller endorses my proposed Rule 801(d)(1)(D). See Miller, supra note 5,
at 35, 58, 72.
63. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
64. Id. 804 advisory committee’s note (1972) (Note to Subdivision (b)).
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Thus, it is uninformative to evaluate a Rule 804 exception by comparing
the reliability of statements falling under that exception to statements that
would qualify for admission under Rule 803. The framework of the rules
anticipates that all Rule 804 exceptions will fail this test. Rule 804
exceptions are not based on an assumption that qualifying hearsay is just as
reliable as live testimony. Instead, Rule 804 exceptions must only meet the
standard that hearsay passing through them is preferable to the “complete
loss of the evidence of the declarant.”65 Consequently, the proper test of
whether proposed Rule 804(b)(5) meets the requisite reliability standard
would be to compare statements admitted under the proposed rule to those
admitted under other Rule 804 exceptions, like dying declarations,
statements against interest, and forfeiture by wrongdoing. Here, the
proposed exception stacks up quite well.
Reliability flaws in the Rule 804 exceptions are well established. As
virtually everyone acknowledges, the dying declaration exception (Rule
804(b)(2)) is: (1) based on untested spiritual assumptions and (2) presumes
a counterintuitive measure of lucidity on the part of the dying that science
does not support.66 Skepticism of “statements against interest” (Rule
804(b)(3)) is also widespread, drawing on the exception’s now abandoned
historical limitation to statements against pecuniary or proprietary
interest,67 and the rule’s failure to acknowledge the virtual impossibility of
a voluntary statement that is truly thought by its speaker to be against one’s
own interest.68 The exception permitting hearsay statements of a person
rendered unavailable by a party’s wrongdoing (Rule 804(b)(6)) makes no
pretense at all to reliability. 69 It is intended to reduce anti-witness violence
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., John J. Capowski, Statements Against Interest, Reliability, and the
Confrontation Clause, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 471, 475 (1997) (“[D]ying declarations may
be highly unreliable. . . . Despite the potential unreliability of such statements, the exception
was established in homicide cases to compensate for the unavailability of the declarant.”);
Bryan A. Liang, Shortcuts to “Truth”: The Legal Mythology of Dying Declarations, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 229, 237–43 (1998) (highlighting scientific evidence that casts doubt on the
reliability of statements of the dying); see also FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note
(1972) (Note to Subdivision (b) Exception (2)) (acknowledging that “the original religious
justifications for the exception may have lost its conviction for some persons over the
years”).
67. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note (1972) (Note to Subdivision
(b) Exception (3)) (acknowledging common law limitation).
68. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999) (describing suspicion of
unreliability that attaches to accomplice confessions); Herbert v. Lankershim, 71 P.2d 220,
230 (Cal. 1937) (noting in the context of a statement against interest that, “[o]n the subject of
oral admissions, unless corroborated by satisfactory evidence, this court, in [a prior case],
rates it as the weakest of testimony that can be produced”); John P. Cronan, Do Statements
Against Interest Exist? A Critique of the Reliability of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)
and a Proposed Reformulation, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3 (2002) (describing
psychological factors that undermine the assumptions of the rule and arguing that “research
and common experience reveal myriad reasons why persons make untrue, self-incriminating
statements”).
69. See FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note (1997) (Subdivision (b)(6))
(justifying the rule as a “prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent behavior ‘which strikes at
the heart of the system of justice itself’” (citation omitted)).
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and intimidation, regardless of the reliability of the witness’s potential
testimony or hearsay statements.
In sum, defenders of the Rule 804 exceptions search in vain for definitive
support for the reliability of qualifying statements.
The key to
understanding these exceptions is necessity. While there is some measure
of reliability in statements that fall under the rule, their admission can best
be explained as a choice of evils. In light of the declarant’s unavailability,
Rule 804 permits the jury to hear the out-of-court statements (e.g., an
alleged accomplice’s confession, the victim’s dying accusations, or the
silenced witness’s previous words) in lieu of depriving jurors of that
declarant’s evidence altogether. My proposed exception embodies this
same philosophy. Proposed Rule 804(b)(5) applies only when the declarant
is unavailable. Thus, the question is not whether a preserved text message
from an unavailable witness relating relevant events will always be reliable.
Instead, it is whether the jury should be permitted to view such a text
message given that it will never hear from the declarant. My confidence
that the answer to this question is “yes!” stems not only from the necessity
factor, but also the reliability enhancement of the RSRP exception (missing
from all the other Rule 804 exceptions), that the absent witness’s
communication can be shown directly to the jury. Unlike an oral
“statement against interest” or “dying declaration” relayed to the jury by a
police officer, jailhouse informant, or other interested party who may have
reason to embellish (or manufacture) a critical statement, an RSRP comes
to the jury preserved in its original form.
B. Prejudice to Defendants, Evidence Fabrication, and Misunderstanding
Another objection to the portion of my proposal that admits certain
hearsay statements of unavailable declarants stems from a sense that
admitting such evidence aggrieves criminal defendants. In reality, the
proposed rule enables defendants and prosecutors as well as civil litigants to
provide reliable evidence to juries. Criminal defendants would likely
invoke the rule to introduce evidence of third-party perpetrators or to
support alibi testimony. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly the case that the
rule will be more commonly invoked in the criminal context by prosecutors,
largely because criminal defendants present evidence less frequently.
Still, rules drafters should be cautious in evaluating this critique. Due to
the “reasonable doubt” standard and the allocation of the burden of proof,
criminal defendants generally benefit more from evidentiary gaps than
prosecutors or civil litigants. Thus, criminal defendants will view the factfinders’ ignorance of even reliable information with an understandable but
undeniably partisan relish. Drafters of evidence rules should not adopt this
same perspective. Criminal defendants do, of course, receive special
dispensation in the rules of evidence, but that dispensation is largely a
product of constitutional, not rule-based, considerations and primarily, in
this context, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.70
70. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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These constitutional considerations are important, but as the Advisory
Committee has recognized, they need not be incorporated into the rules
themselves.71 For this reason, the hearsay exceptions are crafted as
“exemption from the general exclusionary mandate of the hearsay rule,
rather than in positive terms of admissibility.”72 As is currently the case,
prosecution evidence may make it through a hearsay exception only to be
barred by the Sixth Amendment. The RSRP exception follows the same
pattern. That said, because the RSRP carves out statements made in
contemplation of litigation, there will be few occasions where the postCrawford Confrontation Clause mandates exclusion of evidence admitted
under the proposed exception.73
The most powerful remaining defense-focused objection is that evidence
admitted under the proposed objection is particularly unreliable in a manner
not apparent to jurors. If a rule permits evidence to be introduced, that
same rule can be abused through: (1) the creation of fabricated evidence
that appears to meet its requirements; or (2) the admission of authentic
evidence that appears to mean one thing when it actually means something
else.
Focusing more precisely on the potential for intentional abuse of the
proposed exception suggests there is no heightened need for concern here.
The RSRP exception attempts to minimize the risk of abuse by excluding
the types of communications most likely to be fabricated: communications
made to investigators or made in contemplation of litigation, as well as
recorded statements like “notes to self” or diary entries that are not
“communications.”
One of the key protections against fabricated evidence incorporated into
the RSRP exception is requiring proof that a communication was made.74
By requiring a “recorded” communication, the RSRP exception forces those
who would seek to abuse the rule to produce physical evidence at
significant peril. In the electronic context, recorded communications
generally pass through numerous servers and devices. Someone who
attempts to manufacture a text message, for example, would be vulnerable
to disproof by evidence obtained from the (purported) participants’ phones
or the phone company. 75
71. FED. R. EVID. Art. VIII advisory committee’s note (1972) (Introductory Note: The
Hearsay Problem) (emphasizing the “separateness of the confrontation clause and the
hearsay rule”).
72. Id.
73. See Jeffrey Bellin, Applying Crawford’s Confrontation Right in a Digital Age, 45
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 33 (2012) (arguing that the Confrontation Clause will rarely apply to text
messages and social media communications); Bellin, supra note 3, at 59 (emphasizing that
exclusion of statements made in contemplation of litigation conforms to recent
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence).
74. Cf. Judson Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 UCLA L. REV. 43, 53–
54 (1954) (advocating for requiring proof of an actual statement as an element of an
analogous hearsay exception).
75. To avoid these problems, a person might actually send a text message they planned
to use in later litigation, but this is a risky stratagem; such a message could just as easily be
used to implicate them in wrongdoing as exonerate them.
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As this discussion suggests, the primary protection against abuse is not
excluding vast chunks of valuable evidence or writing earnest verbal
protections into existing hearsay rules (“good faith” or “interests of
justice”), but rather the same constraints that protect against evidence
fabrication generally. Authentication requirements dictate that proponents
of any evidence offer sufficient evidence to support a finding that the
evidence “is what the proponent claims it is.”76 Thus, statements offered
under the proposed exception will have to be shown to be, in fact, actual
text messages, tweets, or Facebook status updates from the person claimed.
In addition, the proponent of fabricated evidence takes a huge risk. The
criminal law buttresses the authentication requirements with severe
penalties for falsifying evidence77 and, even apart from those, parties risk
loss at trial (and severe litigation sanctions) if they sponsor evidence that is
exposed as fraudulent.
It is also important to stress that the existing evidence rules already
tolerate a great deal of potential for abuse. To the extent someone is
interested in fabricating evidence, there are abundant ways to do so under
existing rules. Most obviously a person can falsify live testimony. A more
discreet miscreant can, of course, manufacture admissible out-of-court
statements that will be admissible through an existing hearsay exception.
Perhaps the most obvious form of abuse is to falsely assert that the
opposing party admitted guilt. The classic example is the jailhouse “snitch”
or the corrupt police officer who testifies that the defendant confessed.
Looking more specifically at electronic communications, these too can
already be fabricated in a manner that permits them to fall within a wide
variety of exceptions: as present sense impressions, recorded recollections,
state of mind, business records or, if all else fails, the residual exception.
Hypothesize for a moment a bad actor intent on fabricating electronic
evidence. Why wouldn’t this scoundrel simply fabricate a text message
from the defendant (or plaintiff) and offer it, without controversy, as a
statement of a party, rather than attempt the more complicated task of
admitting it as a non-party’s RSRP. In short, someone bent on fabricating
evidence can already do so. The Recorded Statement of Recent Perception
exception, like any rule of admission, slightly increases the menu of
options, but any difference is of degree rather than kind.
The separate concern about potential misunderstandings must be
conceded to a degree. The abbreviations, slang, and shorthand often present
in hurried, terse electronic communication certainly lend themselves to later
misunderstandings, a danger supplemented by the phenomenon of
“autocorrect.” In this respect, Professor Miller cleverly uses my own
warnings regarding the vagaries of electronic communications against me.78
There are, of course, some protections. There is almost always some
context for electronic statements. Social media posts and text messages are
76. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
77. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 132 (West 2013).
78. Miller, supra note 5, at 70 (quoting Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the
Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 364–65 (2012)).
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generally components of a broader exchange that includes responses and
comments that can shed light on potential ambiguity. Similarly, significant
autocorrect errors are often noted by the participants in the effected
communication. Finally, there must be some allowance for attorneys to
exercise advocacy and jurors to apply their common sense. Autocorrect
errors can be highlighted and alternative explanations for terms or
abbreviations suggested. The time is near, if it has not arrived already,
when jurors will understand the vagaries of electronic communication well
enough that the potential for misunderstanding will be deemed precisely
equivalent to that of oral communication. For those immersed in the
electronic medium, there is little doubt that the potential for
misunderstanding a recorded text message is in the same ballpark as that of
misunderstanding an “excited utterance” or “dying declaration,” particularly
as the latter are presented secondhand (through the recollection of a
potentially interested witness), while the former are presented to the jury
precisely as originally uttered.
Finally, it is worth noting that there is a strange irony underlying these
objections. Abuse and misunderstanding objections garner most of their
persuasive force not because recorded, electronic communications are more
easily fabricated or misunderstood than other evidence, but because they
may be unusually persuasive. This logic cannot win out, however. It
would be a strange system of evidence that shrank from a hearsay exception
on the ground that evidence that falls within the exception was suspect
because it is widely viewed by regular people (i.e., jurors) as a reliable
source of information. After all, that type of consensus is quite close to the
point of having hearsay exceptions in the first place.
CONCLUSION
As Professors Shechtman and Miller easily establish, my proposed RSRP
exception is not perfect. Like all hearsay exceptions it is over- and underinclusive. Hearsay admitted under the exception will sometimes be less
reliable than live witness testimony. That is not the test, however. The
question, given the contours of the proposed Rule 804 exception, is whether
statements falling within its requirements should be kept from the jury even
when jurors will not be able to hear from the declarant. I welcome
suggestions as to how the exception might be improved, including, perhaps,
a “good faith” proviso to ease concerns about outlier statements. In my
view, however, an exception along the lines of my proposal is the best path
forward and far superior to the more drastic suggestion of hearsay reform
offered by Judge Posner and others. And that may prove to be the critical
inquiry. Given the most recent communication revolution, the question
may not, in fact, be whether the evidentiary landscape should change, but
instead what role the Advisory Committee will play in the inevitable
changes emerging on the horizon.

